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THE SANCTITY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
OF MINORITY FAITHS UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS:
THREE HYPOTHESES
GARY S. GILDIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Symposia have approached the challenging topic of religion
and law from a variety of perspectives. Perhaps most often, the
inquiry ponders the role religious tenets should play in informing or
shaping positive secular law. When, if ever, is it appropriate for a
representative in a liberal democracy to invoke the judgment of God in
support of specific policy initiatives?' What weight, if any, should
religious persuasion have in a secular court?2 Do religious values lie
at the heart of the foundation of law, meriting expression in legal
norms? 3 Have conventional Western understandings of the nature of
law and human rights been misguided by viewing religion as a
problem for, rather than a source of insight about or legitimization of,
the law? 4 Commentators also have probed reconciliation between the
religious belief of actors in the legal system and their secular
obligations.5 Still others have explored the converse question of the
proper influence law may exert upon theology.
6
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1. Symposium, The Religious Voice in the Public Square, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1401
(1996).
2. Symposium, Religion and the Judicial Process: Legal, Ethical and Empirical
Dimensions, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 177 (1998).
3. Timothy P. Terrell, The Foundations of Law: Confronting the Legal Meaning of
Religious Faith: Wringing Universal Values Out of Pluralism Itself, 54 EMORY L.J. 337, 339
(2005); Samuel J. Levine, Religion's Role in the Administration of the Death Penalty, 9 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 179, 182-85 (2000).
4. Mark C. Modak-Truran, Law, Religion and Human Rights in Global Perspective, 22
MIss. C. L. REV. 165 (2003); Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Religious Liberty at Home and Abroad:
Reflections on Protecting the Fundamental Freedom, 2001 BYU L. REV. 413 (2001).
5. Honorable Helen "Ginger" Berrigan, Legal Ethics & Religion: An Oxymoron?, 13
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 609, 610 (2001); Russell G. Pearce, Foreword: The Religious Lawyering
Movement: An Emerging Force in Legal Ethics, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1075 (1998); Bruce A.
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This article will not tackle the overarching theoretical inquiry
into the interrelationship between values gleaned from religious
interpretation and mores promoted by secular law. Rather, it
undertakes a more modest examination of the degree to which
worshipers of minority faiths in twenty-first century America are
protected against burdens on their religion imposed by secular laws
reflective of majoritarian values.
Followers of non-mainstream religions in the United States
whose faith is unintentionally burdened by state and local laws must
resort to state, as opposed to federal, constitutions to secure exemption
and accommodation. Recent developments have issued contradictory
signals regarding the extent to which state constitutions may be relied
upon to preserve minority sects. In response to diminution of federal
constitutional protection, courts have construed state constitutions to
exhibit heightened solicitude for religious pluralism, exempting
congregants of non-mainstream faiths from general laws representative
of majority values except in compelling circumstances. On the other
hand, states have with equal vigor amended their constitutions to
proscribe conduct that offends a fundamental majoritarian religious
tenet-that marriage be reserved as a bond between a man and a
woman. This article will offer three hypotheses as to what these
facially inconsistent trends signify as to the trust worshipers of non-
mainstream faiths should place in the shelter offered by state
constitutions.
II. THE RELEVANCE OF LAW'S TREATMENT OF MINORITY FAITHS
Any theoretical or practical balance between law and religion
must account for consequences to the liberty of believers in dogma not
shared by the majority. As James Madison observed in Federalist No.
Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS
19 (1997); Thomas E. Baker & Timothy W. Floyd, A Symposium Pricis, 27 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 911 (1996).
6. Joseph Allegretti, The Theology of the Practice of Law, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1065,
1066 (2002).
7. Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q.
919 (2004); Stephen Feldman, Religious Minorities and the First Amendment: The History,
the Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222 (2003); Gregory C. Sisk, How
Traditional and Minority Religions Fare in the Courts: Empirical Evidence from Religious
Liberty Cases, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 1021 (2005); MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. DESTRO,
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY (2d ed. 2002); ERIC MICHAEL MAZUR, THE
AMERICANIZATION OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES: CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
(1999); FRANK S. RAVITCH, SCHOOL PRAYER AND DISCRIMINATION: THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF
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51, "In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same
as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the
multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects."
8
The means by which law reconciles majoritarian interests and
minority faith traditions not only has consequences for the religious
liberty of individuals, but may impact the stability of the body politic
as a whole. Assimilating the rights of non-mainstream sects continues
to challenge modern society. The struggle over the treatment and
status of Sunni Muslims in a burgeoning Iraqi democracy numerically
dominated by Shiite followers threatens a civil war. The furious
reaction to publication of cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad
highlights the tension between Western European constitutional values
and beliefs held precious by Islamic minorities in those countries.
Thomas Friedman recently issued an ominous warning:
[T]he world is drifting dangerously toward a
widespread religious and sectarian cleavage-the likes
of which we have not seen for a long, long time. The
only country with the power to stem this toxic trend is
America. People across the world shall look to our
example of pluralism, which is like no other.
9
Accommodating members of non-mainstream faiths, however,
is likely to become increasingly challenging in the United States due to
a rise in religious diversity. The expanding number and changing
origin of America's immigrant population has contributed to a general
broadening of religious pluralism." In 2000, the Association of
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES AND DISSENTERS (1999); MINORITY FAITHS AND THE AMERICAN
PROTESTANT MAINSTREAM (Jonathan D. Sarna ed., 1998); Richard K. Sherwin, Rhetorical
Pluralism and the Discourse Ideal: Countering Division of Employment v. Smith, A Parable
of Pagans, Politics and Majoritarian Rule, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 388 (1991); Suzanna Sherry,
Religion and the Public Square: Making Democracy Safe for Religious Minorities, 47 DEPAUL
L. REV. 499 (1998); Rosalie Berger Levinson, The Dark Side of Federalism: Restricting the
Rights of Religious Minorities, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 47 (1998); Samuel J. Levine, Toward a
Minority Voice: A Look at Free Exercise Rights Through a Minority Perspective, 5 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 153 (1996).
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
9. Thomas L. Friedman, War of the Worlds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2006, at A23.
10. Cynthia Norman Williams, America's Opposition to New Religious Movements, 27
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 171, 174 (2003).
11. Barry A. Kosmin, Egon Mayer and Ariela Keyser, American Religious
Identification Survey, at 23 (2001) [hereinafter ARIS Survey]. Stephen M. Feldman,
Religious Minorities and the First Amendment: The History, the Doctrine, and the Future, 6
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222, 226 (2003) ("[S]tarting in the mid-nineteenth century, immigration
helped produce an ever-expanding American Catholic community.").
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Statisticians of American Religious Bodies (ASARB) issued results of
a study of membership in religious congregations in the United States.
ASARB identified 265 distinct religious bodies claiming
congregations, 149 of which agreed to participate in the study. 12 The
2001 American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS) of adults ages
eighteen and older documented thirty-five independent Christian
religious faiths as well as almost eight million members of twenty
identifiable non-Christian religious sects. 13
Even within mainstream faiths, there may be an uptick in
individualized interpretation of religious dogma. The 2001 ARIS
survey revealed that almost forty percent of persons who identified
with a particular religion confessed that no member of their household
belonged to a church or comparable institution, with formal affiliation
varying significantly amongst religions. 14  The authors of the ARIS
survey interpreted these findings to represent "the difference between
identification as a state of heart and mind and affiliation as a social
condition," "differences in the value and meaning attached to
affiliation within various religious movements," and "differences in
meaning associated with religion itself."15 The authors further opined
that those who identify with a religion while at the same time
abnegating institutional membership may represent what sociologist
Thomas Lackmann characterized as "The Invisible Religion," where
"[t]he modem sacred cosmos legitimates the retreat of the individual
into the 'private sphere' and sanctifies his (or her) subjective
autonomy." 16 Consequently, potential for conflict in the United States
between majoritarian spiritual values and an individual's religious
12. The Association utilized the Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches to label
the discrete sects. DALE E. JONES ET AL., RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS AND MEMBERSHIPS IN
THE UNITED STATES: 2000, at xvii (2002).
13. ARIS Survey, supra note 11, at 12-13. As compared to the 1990 survey, the
proportion of the population identifying with Christianity declined from 86% to 77%. The
number of adults classifying themselves as non-Christian increased by almost 2,000,000,
albeit representing a rise in percentage of the population only from 3.3% to 3.7%. The most
significant increase was the doubling of adults bound to no religious identification, rising from
14.3 million (8% of total population) to 29.4 million (14% of total population). Id. at 10-11.
14. ARIS Survey, supra note 11, at 16.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 14, quoting THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE INVISIBLE RELIGION: THE PROBLEM OF
RELIGION IN MODERN SOCIETY (1967). Additional evidence of increasing religious pluralism
may be gleaned from the finding that 16% of the United States adult population reported
having switched their religious preference or identification. Id. at 23. Furthermore, 22% of
households that included either a married or domestic partner reported non-uniform religious
identification amongst the couples. Id. at 29. See also Douglas Laycock, Continuity and
Change in the Threat to Religious Liberty: The Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth
Century, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1047, 1073 (1996).
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tenet may exist not only between different faith traditions, but may lie
within the mainstream religious group.
17
III. POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND PROTECTION OF MINORITY FAITHS
The ability of non-mainstream believers to pursue their faith
traditions turns largely upon the structure of the political community.
In a theocracy where religion is the source of all law, non-adherents
may be punished for apostasy.' In an autocratically secular state
where religion may be deemed a threat to state control, worship may
be banned or regulated to such a degree that any exercise of faith is
dampened. 19
As made plain by recent elections in Iraq and Palestine,
democracy is no guarantee of liberty for minority faiths.20  The
majority may transmute its religious tenets into positive law, barring
individuals from acting upon beliefs that conflict with the will of the
dominant tradition. While it is tempting to distinguish Iraq and
Palestine because of the prevalence of a single sect, diversity of
religions in the United States does not assure democracy will protect
liberty of individual belief. While the ASARB study fielded responses
from 149 distinct religious bodies, ninety-one percent of members of
institutional religions were clustered in seventeen denominations.
Adherents of eighty-seven other identified religious bodies composed
but two percent of the population. Similarly, the ARIS study
revealed 76.5% of the population self-identified with a Christian
religious group, with well over half the population aligned with one of
six faiths-Catholic, Baptist, Protestant, Methodist/Wesleyan,
22Lutheran or Presbyterian. Minority faiths lack the political clout
necessary to defeat legislative initiatives intended to disadvantage their
17. See Berg, infra note 75, at 928; Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious
Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 217 (1991) (identifying how
different means of categorizing religious groups yield varying results of which religions are
minorities or outsiders).
18. Peter J. Riga, Islamic Law and Modernity: Conflict and Evolution, 36 AM. J. JURIS.
103, 108 (1991).
19. D.V. Cherniaeva, The Legal Status of Religious Organizations in the Russian
Federation, 9 SUDEBINE 617, 624-33 (2004).
20. See Nathaniel Stinnett, Defining Away Religious Freedom in Europe: How Four
Democracies Get Away With Discriminating Against Minority Religions, 28 B.C. INTL. &
COMP. L. REV. 429 (2005).
21. Jones, supra note 12, at ix.
22. ARIS Survey, supra note 11, Exhibit 1 at 12.
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23faith. Beyond intentional discrimination, legislatures may in good
faith enact general laws ignorant of the burden imposed on the religion
24of those whose views are unrepresented in the assembly.
To secure the exercise of minority faith, the body politic must
be constrained by constitutional measures that dilute the power of
majoritarianism. The American legal system relies upon two
constitutional mechanisms to protect minority faiths: (1) the division
of power between state and national government, and (2) prescribed
limits on the power of any level of government to invade religious
liberty.
In Federalist No. 10, James Madison articulated the danger of
political faction as a primary rationale for creation of a national
government. Madison specifically cited religious majorities as a
potential source of peril in individual states:
A religious sect may degenerate into a political
faction in a part of the confederacy; but the variety of
sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the
national councils against any danger from that source.
26
23. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938); Robert Post,
Democracy and Equality, 1 LAW, CULTURE AND THE HUMANITIES 142 (2005); David
Steinberg, Rejecting the Case Against the Free Exercise Exemption: A Critical Assessment, 75
B.U.L. REV. 241, 253 (1995) ("Small, unfamiliar, and unpopular religions face far more
uncertain treatment from the political branches of government.").
24. The burden on minority faiths from neutral regulation is compounded when the
administrative bureaucracy is asked to grant a religious exception. Not only is authority for an
exemption absent from the face of the statute; it is premised upon a religious practice likely to
be entirely foreign to the official. See Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202 (3rd Cir.
2004); Sisk, supra note 7, at 1025 ("[Tlhe insensitivity of governmental bureaucracy will be a
continual and disturbing source of imposition upon religious minorities. No system of
legislative exemptions can fully address the unthinking enforcement of general rules by
administrators or government functionaries despite religious objections and the absence of any
genuine and concrete basis for an action beyond routine habits.").
25. Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of
Religious Liberty, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1810, 1812 (2004) ("America's extraordinary religious
pluralism, scholars often argue, is the direct result of a system of religious freedom that at the
very least prevents majorities from imposing norms of religious exercise on minorities.");
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1248 (1994);
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103 (1980).
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). See also JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES
IN THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION (June 12, 1788), in 3 ELLIOTr's DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, at
330 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1881) ("This freedom arises from
that multiplicity of sects which pervades America, and which is the best and only security for
religious liberty in any society; for where there is such a variety of sects, there cannot be a
majority of any one sect to oppress and persecute the rest.").
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While dispersal of power between national and state
governments may be necessary to diminish the power of majorities to
impinge non-mainstream faith, it is not a sufficient guarantor of
religious liberty. Popular religions may gather sufficient political clout
27to influence law at the national level. Hence our democracy relies
upon an additional constitutional weapon-limits upon the power of
legislative majorities to burden the liberty of individual conscience,
enforceable through the federal judicial branch whose appointed
judges have lifetime tenure.28  Thus, it is to the courts that minority
sects have turned, brandishing constitutions to procure exemption from
laws that conflict with their faiths.
29
IV. THE WANING FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS OF FREE
EXERCISE
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution has proven a durable protectorate of non-
mainstream faiths against intentional incursion by all levels of
27. While cautioning about the volatility in political party affiliations, the ARIS Survey
documented the following preferences of certain faiths:
Jews, Muslims, Buddhists and those with no religion continue to have a
greater preference for the Democratic Party over the Republicans, much as
they did in 1990. Evangelical or Born Again Christians and Mormons are
the most apt to identify as Republicans. Buddhists and those with no
religion are most likely to be political independents. In keeping with their
theology, Jehovah's Witnesses disavow political involvement.
ARIS Survey, supra note 11, at 36. Perhaps the most striking recent example of the power of
the religious right to influence federal legislation was the passage of the Act for the Relief of
the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, which gave the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida jurisdiction to override the state court's approval of the withdrawal
of food, nutrition, fluids or medical care for Ms. Schiavo, who was in a persistent vegetative
state. Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005).
See also Berg, infra note 75, at 925 ("When moral and cultural issues enter the political
process, representative democracy will generally respond to majority religious faiths and
values.").
28. Employment Div. Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
903 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
29. A recent study of religious freedom claims in the lower federal courts from 1986-
1995 revealed that members of Catholic, Baptist and Mainline Protestant faiths comprised but
11% of claimants. On the other hand, 14.5% of claims were lodged by Muslim worshipers,
5.7% by Native Americans and 16.5% by followers of other Christian faiths. Gregory C. Sisk,
Michael Heise & Andrew Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An
Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 562-67 (2004); Sisk,
infra note 80, at 1036.
28 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
government. 30  While no individual right in our constitutional
democracy is absolute, the United States Supreme Court applies the
highest level of scrutiny to laws whose purpose is to burden a
particular religious practice. The majority may intentionally regulate
religious conduct only where it proves a compelling interest that may
not be satisfied by alternatives less restrictive of the religious
practice.3 1 Thus, while the governmental interest in monogamy has
been found of sufficient order to override Mormon tenets permitting
polygamy, 32 the City of Hialeah's disapproval of Santeria religious
exercise involving animal sacrifice was deemed insufficiently weighty
to sustain its ban on such rituals.
33
If the clock were turned back to 1989, minority faiths were
equally insulated from burdens effected by laws passed in ignorance of
the conflict with their religious scruples.3 4  The Supreme Court
required government to prove a compelling interest to justify its
refusal to exempt citizens from laws that impinge their sincerely held
religious beliefs, even if the law was passed without any intent to tamp
the exercise of that faith. The government was required to prove
further that there were no available alternatives to attain its compelling
interest that were less restrictive of the religious belief.3
5
Under the pre-1990 federal constitutional regime, followers of
non-mainstream faiths secured exemption from neutral laws that
happened to clash with their beliefs.36 The Supreme Court ruled the
Amish must be excused from a Wisconsin law requiring children to
attend formal school until the age of sixteen, which had trammeled the
30. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment likewise protects minority faiths
against compulsion. This article, however, focuses more narrowly on the constitutional
protection afforded by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and its state
constitutional counterparts.
31. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
32. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878).
33. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).
34. An emerging thread of scholarship has questioned the traditional notion that before
1990 the United States Supreme Court fulfilled its institutional role as guardian of minority
religious liberty. See articles cited in Feldmen, supra note 7, at 224.
35. See Hernandez v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 689 (1989); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693,
732 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982).
Minority faiths were protected not only by strict scrutiny of the government's regulation but
by respect for the individualized nature of the belief. The citizen was not required to prove the
religious belief burdened was a central tenet of his faith nor that it was shared as orthodoxy by
other members of the sect. See Hernandez, 490 U.S. 680; see also Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of
Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989).
36. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,236 (1972).
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sincere Old Order Amish belief that sending children to high school
would endanger their salvation.37 The Court held the State of South
Carolina could not deny welfare benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist
who declined to work on Saturday, her Sabbath. 38 The Court restored
public benefits to a Jehovah's Witness who, in violation of statutory
eligibility requirements, voluntarily relinquished his job after
discovering he was fabricating tank turrets and other weaponry in
violation of his faith.3 9
A sea change in federal constitutional protection of minority
sects occurred in 1990, when the Supreme Court held it would no
longer apply strict scrutiny to across-the-board, uniform laws whose
effect, but not intent, is to burden an individual's religion. 40 Instead,
religious liberty would be sacrificed whenever the government had a
rational basis for the regulation. 41 The principal rationale for reduction
of judicial scrutiny, and the concomitant shrinking of protection for
non-mainstream sects, was the primacy of democratic choice in
balancing the value of collective secular interests against the cost to
individual spirituality. Contrary to Madison's admonition that
religious pluralism was a necessary condition to liberty, Justice Scalia
viewed increasing diversity of religious belief as "courting anarchy.,
42
The Court was cognizant that leaving accommodation of religious
practices burdened by governmental regulation to majoritarian
political processes would disproportionately disadvantage minority
faiths; that cost, however, was deemed an "unavoidable consequence
of democratic government.
43
Interestingly, democracy exercised its newfound power by
reinstating strict scrutiny throuh the Federal Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). The Court, however, banished this
exertion of democratic will as unconstitutional. In City of Boerne v.
Flores,45 the Court held RFRA violated both horizontal and vertical
37. Id.
38. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,409-10 (1963).
39. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981).
40. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
41. Strict scrutiny would continue to be applied only in three circumstances: (1) where
the intent of the law was to burden religion; (2) where the statutory scheme includes secular
exemptions or a protocol for exemptions; and (3) "hybrid rights" cases where the claim is
based not only on the Free Exercise Clause but also on an additional fundamental right. Id. at
877-84.
42. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
43. Id. at 890.
44. 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1 et seq. (1994). The Act was approved unanimously by the
House and by all but three Senators. 139 Cong. Rec. S 14461-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993).
45. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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separation of powers. Congress's attempt to restore the pre-Smith
microscope of scrutiny to laws that burden individual faith was not an
attempt to remedy constitutional violations consistent with Congress's
power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; rather RFRA
redefined the parameters of the Free Exercise Clause arrogating the
Court's power to interpret the law.46 Furthermore, by imposing upon
the states its weighing of the interests of the body politic and
individual religious faith, Congress invaded the states' reserved power
to provide for the general welfare of its citizens.
47
Because the federalism underpinning of City of Boerne is
absent when the burden on religion is imposed by federal regulation,
many lower federal courts found RFRA constitutional when invoked
to procure exemptions from federal, as opposed to state and local,
laws.48 In Cutter v. Wilkinson,49 the Supreme Court noted it had yet to
rule whether RFRA legitimately mandates strict scrutiny of burdens on
religion erected by federal laws and regulations. However, in
Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Unaio Do Vegetal,5° the
Court affirmed a preliminary injunction, issued under RFRA,
exempting members of a Christian Spiritist religion from the Federal
Controlled Substance Act ban on the use of a hallucinogen which the
religion employed in sacramental tea for communion. While the Court
did not explicitly address the constitutionality of RFRA as applied to
religious exemptions from federal laws, in a footnote it stated that
Boerne "held the application to States to be beyond Congress's
legislative authority under [section] 5 of the 14th Amendment.",51
Hence, it appears through RFRA, minority faiths will be safeguarded
from federal regulation affecting their liberty.52 Federal constitutionaland statutory law, however, provide worshipers of non-mainstream
46. Id. at 518-19.
47. Id. at 520-21.
48. O'Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2003); Guam v.
Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1220-22 (9th Cir. 2002).
49. 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2118 n.2 (2005).
50. 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006).
51. Id. at 1217, n.1.
52. The Gonzalez Court also applied the compelling interest test in a manner protective
of non-mainstream faiths. The Court rejected the government's argument that it could refuse a
religious exemption based solely upon an interest in uniform enforcement or a generalized fear
of a slippery slope. Rather, the Court held, RFRA requires judicially crafted exceptions on a
case-by-case basis, with the government bearing the burden of proving a compelling interest in
denying an exemption to "the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being
substantially burdened." Id. at 1220.
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sects no right to be excused from state or local laws of general
applicability that invade their religious practices. 5
3
The Court's Smith and Boerne opinions unleashed a torrent of
commentary bemoaning abandonment of federal constitutional
protection for minority faiths. Yet even the most searing critics
acknowledged that their argument was not likely to impel the Court to
reverse course and restore strict scrutiny essential for the protection of
minority religious traditions.54 As a practical matter, absent an
improbable amendment to the United States Constitution, congregants
of smaller sects find no sanctuary in federal constitutional or statutory
law from neutral state and local laws that happen to invade their
religion. Instead, litigants of necessity have turned to an oft-maligned
source of minority civil liberties-state constitutions.
V. STRICT SCRUTINY OF NEUTRAL BURDENS ON MINORITY RELIGIONS
UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS
While the Supreme Court's decisions in Smith and Boerne
sounded the death knell for federal shelter from inadvertent burdens on
minority religious faith imposed by state and local legislatures, strict
scrutiny has been resurrected under state constitutions. 55 One state-
Alabama-amended its state constitution to require proof of a
compelling interest to sustain burdens on religion.5  Courts in eleven
53. Congress responded to the Court's overruling of RFRA by invoking its Spending
and Commerce Clause powers to pass the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). 42 U.S.C. §2000a et seq. (2006). RLUIPA more narrowly prescribes
strict scrutiny for land use regulations that burden religion and for constraints on religious
exercise of institutionalized persons. In Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005), the Court
held RLUIPA does not violate the Establishment Clause. However, the Court expressly
declined to consider whether RLUIPA exceeded Congress's power under the Spending and
Commerce Clause. Id. at 2120, n.7.
54. See Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities and the First Amendment: The
History, the Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222, 271-72 (2003) "As a general
matter, a yawning abyss stretches today between the Supreme Court and legal scholars. The
Court shows little interest in legal scholarship and, in fact, has occasionally expressed disdain
for legal academics." Id.
55. Twelve states have enacted state religious freedom acts, legislatively prescribing
exemption from laws that burden sincere religious beliefs unless government proves both a
compelling interest and no less restrictive alternative. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-3 (1998);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571(b) (1997); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35 (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
761.01 (West 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-30 (1999); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493
(1999); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110 (West 1999); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 73-402
( 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-5 (West 1978); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2407 (West
2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 251 (West 2001); Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.302 (2003).
56. ALA. CONST. amend. No. 622.
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states have interpreted their state constitutions to mandate application
of the compelling interest/no less restrictive alternative test to laws that
have the effect of limiting a sincere religious practice, even absent an
untoward legislative purpose.57 Only two state courts have interpreted
their state constitution in lockstep with Smith.58
The theoretical basis for invoking state constitutions to garner
strict scrutiny of state and local laws that happen to infringe a non-
mainstream religious practice is simple and non-controversial. While
Supreme Court interpretations of the federal Constitution set a binding
floor of rights that state courts must respect, they do not construct a
ceiling upon individual rights founded in state constitutions. 59  State
courts are free to find more expansive protection of analogous rights
under their state constitution as long as such rulings do not then invade
other rights secured by the United States Constitution.60  Construing
state constitutions to afford more generous liberty for minority faiths
does no violence to the Supreme Court's abrogation of strict scrutiny
under the Free Exercise Clause. Instead, it is faithful to the notion of
state constitutions as independent sources of liberty that in many
instances preceded codification of rights in the federal charter. 61
57. See Soc'y of Jesus of New England v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571
(Mass. 1990); Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994); Rourke v. N.Y.
State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 603 N.Y.S.2d 647 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993), affd 615 N.Y.S.2d 470
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990); Swanner v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994); Davis v. Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints, 852 P.2d 640 (Mont. 1993); St. John's Lutheran Church v. State
Comp. Ins. Fund, 830 P.2d 1271 (Mont. 1992); State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235 (Wis. 1996);
First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992); Humphrey v.
Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio 2000); State v. Bontranger, 683 N.E.2d 126 (Ohio. Ct. App.
1996); Rupert v. City of Portland, 603 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992); In re Browning, 476 S.E.2d 463
(N.C. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Evans, 796 P.2d 178 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990).
58. See State v. Loudon, 857 S.W.2d 878 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993); Wolf v. Sundquist,
955 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 903 P.2d 351
(Or. 1995).
59. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
60. As the United States Supreme Court recently affirmed in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.
Ct. 2113 (2005), affording enhanced accommodation of non-mainstream faiths does not
violate the First Amendment Establishment Clause. Id.
61. State religious freedom acts similarly do not suffer the constitutional infirmities that
led to the demise of the federal RFRA. By determining that the welfare of its populace is
promoted rather than imperiled by a regime that exempts minority adherents from neutral laws
except where the legislature is furthering compelling interests, state legislatures are exerting
the very latitude the Supreme Court sought to preserve when it struck down Congress's
attempt to exercise its power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Likewise, state
legislatures do not arrogate the Supreme Court's power to declare what protection the Free
Exercise Clause affords when they craft a different balance between collective interests and
individual religious liberty. See Gary S. Gildin, A Blessing in Disguise: Protecting Minority
Faiths Through State Religious Freedom Non-Restoration Acts, 23 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y
411,429-37 (2000).
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While the practical necessity and theoretical justification for
resort to state constitutions are patent, an equally significant but more
vexing inquiry is whether state constitutions will prove reputable
protectors of minority faiths.
VI. REASONS TO BE CONFIDENT THAT STATE CONSTITUTIONS WILL
SECURE MINORITY RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
There are at least seven reasons that portend state constitutions
will more reliably safeguard minority religious liberty against state and
local incursion than the federal Constitution. First, historically state
law and state courts were the initial guardians of individual rights in
general, and religious liberty in particular. State constitutions with
textual guarantees of freedom of conscience predated adoption of the
Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution.62 Until ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, individual rights provisions of the
federal Constitution constrained federal, but not state and local,
government. 63 It was not until 1940 that the United States Supreme
Court ruled the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty and thus applicable to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
64
Thus, for the first 150 years of the republic, state constitutions stood as
the lone constitutional monitor of minority religious liberty.
65
On their face, the texts of state constitutions enact more
expansive guarantees of freedom of religion. While the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides merely that
"Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of
62. See THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH A'ND STATE IN AMERICA TO
THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU ET AL., RELIGION
UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1965).
63. Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
64. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 293, 303 (1940).
65. See Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities and the First Amendment: The
History, The Doctrine and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222, 224 (2003) ("Before the post-
World War II era, the religion clauses were almost toothless in the United States Supreme
Court"); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82
VA. L. REV. 1, 49-50 (1996) (noting state courts prohibited Bible reading on state
constitutional grounds well before a United States Supreme Court Establishment Clause
decision); see also Jason Mazzone, Bodies of Constitutional Law, (Brook. L. Sch., L. Stud.
Paper, Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/DisplayAbstractSearch.cfm
(before ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, state courts applied principles of
constitutional law derived from the federal Constitution to state governments).
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religion," 66 state constitutions codify a broader definition of the right
protected as well as a longer list of governmental actions restrained.
State constitutions may secure a "natural and indefeasible right to
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of his own
conscience" against "molestation," "disturbance," "infringement,"
"control," or "interference. '" 67 While a judicial philosophy of original
intent and textualism may result in a crabbed interpretation of the First
Amendment ban on "prohibiting the free exercise of religion,"68 the
more sweeping language of many state constitutions have led courts to
find enhanced liberty for minority believers. 69
The differential text of state constitutions may accurately and
deliberately reflect an individual state's historic commitment to
religious diversity. Founding the Pennsylvania colony as a "Holy
Experiment," William Penn actively recruited outside the Quaker faith,
believing the security of the body politic would be furthered rather
than threatened by a pluralistic religious community.70 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court pointed to its state history in opting to apply strict
scrutiny and exempt the Old Order Amish from the statutory mandate
to display an orange triangle on their buggies, a requirement that
offended their faith tradition. The court reasoned that the state's
66. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
67. See OHIO CONST., art. 1, § 7 ("All men have a natural and indefeasible right to
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own conscience ... nor shall any
interference with the rights of conscience be permitted); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16 ("The right
of every man to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be
infringed . . . nor shall any control or interference with the rights of conscience be
permitted."); PA. CONST., art. I, § 3 ("All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences... no human authority can,
in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience."); MASS. CONST. art. 2
("[N]o subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for
worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own
conscience."); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of
religious sentiment, belief, and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one
shall be molested or disturbed in person or property on account of religion."). See generally
John Witte, Jr., Religious Rights in the Founding Era, (Emory U. Sch. L., Pub. L. & Legal
Theory, Res. Paper No. 03-22, Nov. 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=480164.
68. See Witte, supra note 67 (arguing that the text of the Free Exercise Clause was not a
deliberate decision to depart from broader terms of state constitutions).
69. Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1044 (Ohio 2000); State v. Miller, 549
N.W.2d 235, 239 (Wis. 1996); First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d
174, 186 (Wash. 1992); Society of Jesus of New England v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564
N.E.2d 571, 572-73 (Mass. 1990); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W. 2d 393, 395 (Minn. 1990).
70. See WILLIAM PENN AND THE FOUNDING OF PENNSYLVANIA: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 53 (Jean R. Soderlund ed., 1983); EDWARD CORBYN OBERT BEATTY, WILLIAM PENN
AS SOCIAL PHILOSOPHER 123 (1939); Gary S. Gildin, Coda to William Penn's Overture:
Safeguarding Non-Mainstream Religious Liberty Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, I U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 81 (2001).
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religiously heterogeneous population mirrored its traditional
commitment to promote and protect religious diversity.7' The
Minnesota Supreme Court required the government to prove a
compelling interest to justify cutting the hair of a prisoner who
believed his long locks were part of the essence of his Native
American spirituality. The court noted that Minnesota had been
settled by people of varied religious backgrounds seeking relief from
religious intolerance in their home countries.
72
Beyond the distinct text and unique historic underpinnings,
fundamental principles of federalism also support construing state
constitutions more liberally to accommodate religious practices of
non-mainstream faiths. Because any decision recognizing a federal
constitutional right must be honored across the country, the United
States Supreme Court is constrained by ignorance of the practical
ability of fifty individual states to implement the right.73 State courts,
however, are far more familiar with the true costs and benefits of
applying strict scrutiny to neutral laws that may negatively impact
minority faiths in their jurisdiction. Consequently, they are freed from
the institutional reluctance of the United States Supreme Court to
expand individual constitutional rights. The rise of state constitutional
protection of non-mainstream religious liberty is a testament to Justice
Brandeis's characterization of states as "laboratories" for "novel and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."
74
State constitutions may be a more reliable guarantor of non-
mainstream liberty because of the religious composition of the
particular state. A faith with a decided minority status nationally may
have clusters of congregants in an individual state that exert more
significant power to inform or influence political outcomes in that
state.75 The ARIS survey found "[w]ith respect to religion in
particular, states differ considerably in the religious make-up of their
71. State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d at 239 (quoting State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17
Wis. 2d at 165, 115 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1962)).
72. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 398 (1990).
73. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973).
It must be remembered that every claim arising under the Equal Protection
Clause has implications for the relationship between national and state
power under our federal system. Questions of federalism are always
inherent in the process of determining whether a state's laws are to be
accorded the traditional presumption of constitutionality, or are to be
subjected instead to rigorous constitutional scrutiny.
Id.
74. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 258 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
75. Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q.
919, 948 (2005).
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populace. That diversity is likely to contribute as much as any other
source of social variation to differences in their cultural and political
climate. ' ' 76  For example, while Baptists comprise 55% of the
population in Mississippi, they constitute but 4% of the population in
Massachusetts.77 Lutherans and Catholics, composing 65% of the
population in North Dakota, may display substantial political sway in
that state. By contrast, their combined 26% of the population in the
State of Washington exceeds by a mere one percent those professing
no religion.78 Furthermore, as Professor Berg has noted, "geographical
numbers do not tell the whole story of whether a group is vulnerable to
political or legal pressure ... [A] group may be small and still have
power as a political or cultural elite.
' 79
Apart from differential distribution of minority faith traditions
among the general populace, a particular state appellate court may
include a more religiously diverse set of decision-makers than the
United States Supreme Court. One study has found significant
correlation between the religion of the judge and his or her willingness
to exempt members of non-mainstream congregations from laws that
burden their faith.80  "Jewish judges along with judges from non-
mainstream Christian backgrounds were significantly more likely to
approve of judicial intervention to overturn the decisions or actions of
the political branch that . . . refused to accommodate religious
dissenters." 81 Of the Justices sitting on the Supreme Court in Smith
76. ARIS Survey, supra note 11, at 38.
77. Id. at 39-40.
78. Id.
79. Berg, supra note 75, at 946.
80. Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of
Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST.
L.J. 491 (2004). See also Donald Songer & Susan J. Tabrizi, The Religious Right in Court:
The Decision Making of Christian Evangelicals in State Supreme Courts, 61 J. POL. 507
(1999) (finding Evangelical judges on state supreme courts vote more conservatively than
mainline Protestant, Catholic and Jewish judges on death penalty, gender discrimination and
obscenity cases); Fred 0. Smith, Gendered Justice: Do Male and Female Justices Rule
Differently on Questions of Gay Rights?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 2087, 2123 (2005) (female judge
more likely than male judge to rule in favor of gays and lesbians on due process and equal
protection claims); James C. Brent, An Agent and Two Principals, U.S. Court of Appeals
Responses to Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 27 AM. POL. Q. 236, 251 (1999) ("Courts with a majority
of Democrats were more likely to decide in favor of the free exercise claimant than were
courts with a majority of Republicans (35.7% v. 22.8%).").
81. Gregory C. Sisk, How Traditional and Minority Religions Fare in the Courts:
Empirical Evidence From Religious Liberty Cases, 76 COL. L. REv. 1021, 1029 (2005) (citing
Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial
Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491,
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and Boerne, only Justices Breyer and Ginsberg were not Christian.82
Appeal to whatever conscious or subconscious impact faith status
exerts on a judge's assessment of the importance of accommodating
non-mainstream believers may find greater resonance in a state
appellate court that is more religiously diverse than the Supreme
Court.
Finally, the relative ease with which state constitutions may be
amended-frequently cited as an inherent weakness of the charters'
protection of minority liberty-may free a court to interpret state
constitutional rights more generously than the federal analog. Only
through the onerous and rarely successful process of constitutional
amendment may the Supreme Court's construction of the Constitution
be countermanded.83  By contrast, the means of amending a state
constitution tilt closer to majoritarianism. Several commentators have
theorized that the comparative ease with which a state legislature-or
citizens by referendum or initiative-may trigger an amendment
emboldens judges to more liberally construe individual rights under
state constitutions. 84  Indeed, Professor Neubome ventured that the
primary function of state constitutions is to shift the political burden of
proof from those advocating creation of the right to those seeking to
abrogate the right.
85
It is tempting to conclude that historically, institutionally, and
practically, resort to state constitutions is a sound and enduring means
of ensuring religious liberty of minority faiths. However, an opposing
set of forces threatens the sanctity of non-mainstream religions under
state law.
511-18 (2004). See also Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and
Academic Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 734 (2005).
82. See also Feldman, supra note 7, at 272 ("So long as the Court remains
predominantly Christian, its decisions and doctrines are likely to favor Christian (if not
Protestant) interests and values."); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 293-94 (1957); but see Berg,
supra note 75, at 965-967 (disagreeing that Supreme Court Free Exercise decisions are
necessarily a product of pro-Christian biases of Justices).
83. U.S. CONST. art. V.
84. Lawrence Schlam, State Constitutional Amending, Interpretation, and Political
Culture: A Case Study in Constitutional Stagnation, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 269 (1994); Paul W.
Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1147
(1993); James Gray Pope, An Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 24 RUTGERS L.
J. 985 (1993); David R. Keyser, State Constitutions and Theories of Judicial Review: Some
Variations on a Theme, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1051 (1985).
85. Burt Neuborne, Foreward: State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights,
20 RUTGERS L.J. 881 (1989).
20061
38 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
VII. REASONS TO BE SKEPTICAL OF STATES AS GUARDIANS OF NON-
MAINSTREAM FAITHS
There is cause to be wary of the capacity of state constitutions
to resist domination by mainstream religious values and serve as
protectorates of minority faiths. As previously noted, Madison cited
the amenability of smaller body politics to religious factions as a
principal justification for a national government. Indeed, many of
the state constitutions in place before adoption of the federal charter
promoted a single established religion.87  Because state court judges
are often elected (and subject to periodic retention by the voters), state
judges may be more responsive to majority wishes and less willing to
accommodate minority sects.8s Even if a state court were to interpret
its constitution contrary to a mainstream religious value, majoritarian
political processes may override that decision with greater ease than if
the right was founded in the federal constitution. In many states, the
process of amending a state constitution more closely resembles
legislation than the super-majoritarian federal and state consensus
necessary to amend the United States Constitution.
89
86. See supra note 26.
87. THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 134-92 (1986).
88. See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1127-28 (1977).
Professor Neuborne identified the following additional reasons why state court judges were
less likely than federal court judges to enforce federal constitutional rights: Since federal
judges are chosen from a smaller, more qualified pool of applicants and are better
compensated than state judges, the federal judiciary is more well versed in the law and more
capable of tackling complex legal issues. Federal judges also tend to have more highly
qualified law clerks and a lighter case load than their state counterparts. Id. at 1122-23.
Federal judges tend to come from a higher socioeconomic class and enjoy a sense of
"mission" and tradition of constitutional enforcement. Finally, federal judges are further
removed from cynicism-breeding fact patterns in constitutional law. State judges, on the other
hand, are often confronted with the worst fact patterns in all types of law, criminal and civil.
Id. at 1125. But see Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walter, Constitutional Litigation in
Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983)
(concluding there is no statistically significant disparity in willingness of state and federal
courts to enforce federal constitutional rights); Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal
Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605 (1981); Thomas H. Lee,
Countermajoritarian Federalism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
89. See generally Janice C. May, Amending State Constitutions 1996-97, 30 RUTGERS
L.J. 1025 (1999); Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Change and Direct Democracy, 66 U. COLO.
L. REV. 143 (1995); James M. Fischer, Ballot Propositions: The Challenge of Direct
Democracy to State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 43 (1983); FLA.
CONST., art. I, § 12; 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1-2 (G. Alan
Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006). From the start, most states made the amendment of
their constitution, the replacement of their constitution, or both relatively easy, and the general
trend has been to facilitate state constitutional amendment and replacement. State
constitutions currently contain more than 5,000 amendments, and most state constitutions have
been amended more than 100 times. Id.
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The history of constitutional liberties of minorities in general
has found states wanting. The "vast transformation from the concepts
of federalism that had prevailed in the late 18th century" 90 culminating
in ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, was generated by the refusal of states to guarantee rights
of newly enfranchised racial minorities. 91  The 1871 Congress
conferred jurisdiction over claimed violations of equal rights upon
federal courts because it mistrusted the willingness or capacity of state
courts to implement constitutional guarantees.92  The struggle over
civil rights persisted into the 1950s and 1960s, when resort to federal
law and federal courts again proved necessary to cure state courts'
unwillingness to override majority sentiment and ensure the
fundamental liberty of persons of color.
The vulnerability of state constitutions to majoritarian religious
sensibilities is manifest in the issue of same-sex marriage. 93  Four
courts have ruled that their state constitutions preclude bans either on
marriage or civil unions between persons of the same sex.94 However,
the constitutions of nineteen states have been amended specifically to
prohibit recognition of marriage between persons of the same sex.9 5 In
90. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
91. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and
Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3-20 (1985); Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90
HARv. L. REv. 1133, 1150-52 (1977).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3); Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503-07
(1982); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
93. See Robert K. Fitzpatrick, Neither Icarus nor Ostrich: State Constitutions as an
Independent Source of Individual Rights, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1833, 1854-61 (2004).
94. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (finding right to civil benefits of marriage
for same-sex couple under the constitution); Deane v. Conaway, Case No.: 24-C-04-005390
(Cir. Ct. of Balt. City) (finding there was no apparent compelling state interest in a statutory
provision of same-sex marriage discriminating, on the basis of sex, against those individuals
whose gender is identical to their spouses); Woo v. California, S135 208 (San Francisco
Superior Ct., Mar. 14, 2005); Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003). On September 14, 2005, the Massachusetts legislature failed to pass a proposal to
amend the state constitution to define marriage as the union of one man and one woman. H.
653, 184th Gen. Court (2005). While it had legalized marriage between persons of the same
sex, the Massachusetts Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of the state's
Marriage Evasion Act, ruling that gay couples who live in a state where same-sex marriages
are prohibited may not legally marry in Massachusetts absent an intent to reside in
Massachusetts. See Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't. of Public Health, 844 N.E.2d 623 (Mass. 2006).
95. ALASKA CONST. art. I § 25 ("To be valid or recognized in this state, a marriage may
exist only between one man and one woman."); ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 1 ("Marriage
consists only of the union of one man and one woman."); GA. CONST. art. I, § IV, para. I
("This state shall recognize as marriage only the union of man and woman. Marriages
between persons of the same sex are prohibited in this state."); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 ("The
legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples."); KAN. CONST.
art. XV, § 16 ("Marriage shall be constituted by one man and one woman only."); Ky. CONST.
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ten of the states, the amendment banning same-sex marriage was
placed on the ballot by voter initiative, and thus at no step in the
96process required greater than majority approval. In nine other states,
the amendment outlawing same sex marriage originated in the
legislature. While most of these states required approval by a super
majority of the legislature to submit the proposed amendment to the
voters, the amendments became law upon the vote of a majority of the
electorate.
97
§ 233a ("Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a
marriage in Kentucky."); LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 ("Marriage in the state of Louisiana shall
consist only of the union of one man and one woman."); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25 ("To secure
and preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and for future generations of children, the
union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a
marriage or similar union for any purpose."); MISS. CONST. annot. art. XIV, § 263A
("Marriage defined as only between a man and a woman."); Mo. CONST. art. I, § 33 ("That to
be valid and recognized in this state, a marriage shall exist only between a man and a
woman."); MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7 ("Only a marriage between one man and one woman
shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in this state."); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 ("Only a
marriage between a man and a woman shall be valid and recognized in Nebraska."); NEV.
CONST. art. I, § 21 ("Only a marriage between a male and female person shall be recognized
and given effect in this state."); N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28 ("Marriage consists only of the legal
union between a man and a woman."); OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 ("Only a union between one
man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by this state and its political
subdivisions."); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35 ("Marriage in this state shall consist only of the
union of one man and one woman."); OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a ("It is the policy of Oregon,
and its political subdivisions, that only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be
valid or legally recognized as a marriage."); TEx. CONST. art. I, § 32 ("Marriage in this state
shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman."); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29
("Marriage consists only of the legal union between a man and a woman.").
By contrast, proposals to amend the United States Constitution to ban same-sex
marriage have failed to emerge from the committees to which they were referred. See S.J.
Res. 13, 109th Cong. (2005); S.J. Res. 1, 109th Cong. (2005); H.J. Res. 39, 109th Cong.
(2005); S.J. Res. 40, 108th Cong. (2004); S.J. Res. 30, 108th Cong. (2004); H.J. Res. 56,
108th Cong. (2003); H.J. Res. 93, 107th Cong. (2002). Congress did adopt the Defense of
Marriage Act which, for purposes of interpreting federal legislation or administrative
regulations, defines marriage as "only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife." 1 U.S.C. § 7. The Act further provides that no state is required to give full
faith and credit to any act of another state "respecting a relationship between persons of the
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State." 28 U.S.C. § 1738c.
96. The Nebraska ballot initiative was ruled an unconstitutional infringement of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because it "imposes significant
burdens on both the expressive and intimate associational rights" of gays and lesbians.
Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005), appeal
docketed, No. 05-2604 (8th Cir. Feb. 13, 2006).
97. The amendments in Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Texas, Utah and Mississippi
required approval by two-thirds of the members of both houses. GA. CONST. art. X, § I, para.
II; KAN. CONST., art. 14, § 1; LA. CONST. art XIII, § 1; TEX. CONST., art. XVII, § 1; UTAH
CONST., art. XXIII, § 1; MISS. CONST. ANN. art. XV, § 273. In Kentucky, three-fifths of all
members of each elected house must approve an amendment. KY. CONST. § 256. In Missouri
and Oklahoma, however, an amendment may be placed on the ballot at the next general
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The specter of majoritarian abrogation of rights founded in
state constitutions is evidenced by the three states which amended their
constitutions in response to state court decisions that opened the door
to constitutional protection of same-sex marriage, or in reaction to
pending litigation threatening such an outcome. In Brause v. Bureau
of Vital Statistics,9 8 the Alaska Superior Court held that denying same-
sex couples the right to marry constituted discrimination on the basis
of sex in violation of Article I, section 3 of the state constitution.
99
The voters of the state of Alaska then successfully initiated a ballot
measure amending the constitution to limit marriage to couples of the
opposite sex.
l00
The citizens of Hawaii similarly overrode judicial
interpretation of the state constitution that permitted gay marriage. In
Baehr v. Lewin, 10 1 the Hawaii Supreme Court held that sex is a suspect
category under the equal protection clause of the Hawaii Constitution.
Consequently, the state could deny marriage licenses to persons of the
same sex only if it could prove a compelling interest. On remand, the
trial judge ruled the state had not met its burden. 1° 2 While the state's
appeal was pending, the voters initiated a ballot measure amending the
Hawaii constitution to provide "[t]he legislature shall have the power
to reserve marriage to opposite sex couples."' 0 3  Pursuant to its
newfound constitutional power, the Hawaii legislature enacted a
statute reqoiring persons be of the opposite sex to enter into a valid
marriage.
election by majority vote of each house; a two-thirds vote of each house is required only if a
special election is ordered. Mo. CONST. art XII, § 2(a); OKLA. CONST., art. XXIV, § 1.
98. No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1988 WL 88743, at 6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998), aff'd
sub nom Brouse v. State, Dept. of H. & S.S., 21 P.3d 357 (Alaska 2001). A study by
Professors Egan and Persily documents that public opinion, fueled by a spike in media
coverage regarding bans on same-sex relations, intensifies following relevant United States
Supreme Court decisions. Nathaniel Persily et. al., Gay Marriage, Public Opinion and the
Courts, (U. of Penn Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 06-17, May 2006) available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=900208.
99. "No person is to be denied the enjoyment of any civil or political right because of
race, color, creed, sex, or national origin." ALASKA CONST., art. I, §3.
100. ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 25 ("To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage
may exist only between one man and one woman").
101. 852P.2d44, 67 (Haw. 1993).
102. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999).
103. HAW. CONST., art. I, § 23.
104. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1.6 (2003). The Hawaii Supreme Court then ordered that
the judgment of the trial court be reversed and the case be remanded for entry of judgment in
favor of the state. Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391 (Haw. December 9,
1999).
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In the face of pending litigation, Oregon likewise adopted a
constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage.
Notwithstanding the Oregon statute providing "[m]arriage is a civil
contract entered into in person by males at least 17 years of age and
females at least 17 years of age, ' 05 Multnomah County began issuing
marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Although the Governor then
directed the State Registrar to refuse to file or register any same-sex
marriage records forwarded to that office, both the trial court and
circuit court upheld the validity of the marriage licenses. While the
case was pending before the state supreme court, Oregon voters
adopted Ballot Measure 36, a voter initiated amendment to the Oregon
constitution defining marriage as a relationship between one man and
one woman. The Oregon Supreme Court then ruled the case moot.
10 6
There is substantial evidence linking state constitutional bans
on same-sex marriage to majoritarian religious beliefs. 10 7  A 2003
national survey, conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People
and the Press and the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, found
that 55% of respondents believed engaging in homosexual behavior
was a sin; 76% of persons with a high level of religious commitment
shared that view.10 While 59% of the adults surveyed rejected gay
marriage, 80% of persons with a high level of religious commitment
opposed such unions. 10 9 Conversely, almost half the adults with a
relatively low religious commitment supported extending the right to
marry to same sex couples.110 By far the most cited reason for
opposing gay marriage was religious, with 28% squarely espousing
homosexuality as immoral, a sin or contrary to the Bible and another
17% responding more generally that gay marriage is against their
religious belief. 11 A study of twenty public opinion polls similarly
confirmed attendance at religious services and "moral traditionalism"
105. OR. REV. STAT. 106.010 (2005).
106. Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91 (Or. 2005).
107. The Biblical and institutional religious injunctions against homosexuality and same
sex marriage are compiled in Larry Catd Backer, Religion as the Language of Discourse of
Same Sex Marriage, 30 CAP. U. L. REv. 221 (2002); and SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON
46-53 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 2004).
108. Press Release, Pew Research Center, Republicans Unified, Democrats Split on Gay
Marriage: Religious Belief Underpin Opposition to Homosexuality 2 (Nov. 18, 2003),
available at http://pewforum.org/docs/index.php?DocID=37.
109. Id. The survey further found that persons who hear their religious officials preach
about homosexuality are more prone to markedly negative views of gays and lesbians.
110. Id. at4.
111. Id.
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as among the strongest predictors of a person's attitude towards gay
marriage.112
The widespread incidence of state constitutional amendments
banning same sex marriage-at times negating judicial decisions
interpreting the state constitution to protect such unions-exemplifies
the greater susceptibility of state constitutions to sway by majoritarian
influence. These amendments further evidence, as Madison feared,
that the rights of minority faiths under state constitutions remain
vulnerable to factions of mainstream sects.
VIII. HYPOTHESIS AS TO THE SECURITY OF MINORITY FAITHS UNDER
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
This article does not undertake the daunting, if not impossible,
task of correlating the multiple variables that may account for a state's
constitutional stance on accommodation of minority believers or its
constitutional temperature on same-sex marriage. Indeed, no clear
pattern exists among the states that have staked a constitutional
position on the level of scrutiny to be applied to claims of religious
exemption from general law or the issue of same-sex marriage. Of the
twelve states endorsing the compelling interest test, four have also
adopted constitutional amendments prohibiting recognition of
marriages of persons of the same gender. One state, Massachusetts,
has both endorsed strict scrutiny of burdens on religion and recognized
a constitutional right to same-sex marriage." 4 Conversely, one of the
two states whose court refused to afford a more generous right of
liberty of conscience under the state constitution also has amended its
constitution to overturn threatened judicial protection of gay
marriage.11 5 In eleven states that passed constitutional amendments
prohibiting same-sex marriage, the courts have not had occasion to
rule on the appropriate level of scrutiny governing accommodation of116
minority sects. At the same time, in three states whose courts have
protected same-sex unions, the courts have not resolved the test
112. The other reliable predictors were education, age and feelings toward gays. Persily,
supra note 98, at 29.
113. Alaska, Kansas, Montana, and Ohio. Alabama, the one state to impose the
compelling interest test by constitutional amendment, has not acted to ban same-sex marriage.
114. The security of the Massachusetts Supreme Court's Goodridge decision remains
under legislative attack. See supra note 94.
115. OR.CONSTart. VX, § 5(a).
116. Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska,
Nevada, North Dakota, and Utah.
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governing religious exemptions. 1 7 Finally, among the twelve states
that enacted strict scrutiny by legislation rather than constitutional
interpretation or amendment, three have erected constitutional bans to
gay marriage. 11
8
A state's constitutional treatment of either issue turns on the
complex intertwining of the serendipity of religious liberty or same-
sex marriage cases appearing on the court's docket, the religious
affiliation of its judges, the pluralism of its legislature, the religious
composition of a state's populace, and the forces that galvanize its
representatives and voters to act. In light of the complexity if not
impossibility of measuring these variables, this preliminary inquiry
offers three modest hypotheses that may account for the relatively
contemporaneous state constitutional ascendency of strict scrutiny of
state regulations that burden religious faith and bans on same-sex
marriage. The extent to which minority sects may feel secure in the
shelter afforded by state constitutions may rest on which hypothesis
proves true.
A. The "Bans on Gay Marriage Have Nothing to Do with Minority
Religion" Hypothesis
First, it is arguable that state constitutional prohibition of same-
sex marriage is not a product of hostility towards non-mainstream
faiths that would be inconsistent with the state charters' more generous
exemption of minority sects from secular laws. While barring same
sex marriage may be motivated by majoritarian religious tenets, it does
not follow that such bans in turn denigrate competing faith traditions.
State constitutional amendments precluding gay marriage have not
been erected to repel arguments that same-sex marriage is required by
non-mainstream faith traditions. Rather, proponents of the right of
persons of the same sex to marry to date have invoked secular
attributes of privacy, equality or autonomy as the font of constitutional
protection. 119  Thus repudiation of same-sex marriage may have
nothing to do with antipathy towards less popular religions.
117. Maryland, California, and Vermont.
118. Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas.
119. See Backer, supra note 107. As the Pew Study revealed, almost 50% of respondents
with a relatively low religious commitment support the right of same sex couples to marry.
Press Release, Pew Research Center, Republicans Unified, Democrats Split on Gay Marriage:
Religious Belief Underpin Opposition to Homosexuality 4 (Nov. 18, 2003), available at
http://pewforum.org/docs/index.php?DocID=37.
[VOL. 6:21
THE SANCTITY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
Furthermore, the two rights in issue have attributes-not
anchored in religion-that make accommodation of minority faith a
more deserving candidate for state constitutional protection than same
sex marriage. In construing state constitutions to impose the
compelling interest/no less restrictive alternatives test on laws that
burden sincere religious beliefs, state courts were not advancing new
or unenumerated rights. As analyzed earlier, followers of non-
mainstream faiths have obtained enhanced security under state
constitutional rights that in many cases are textually distinct from the
general language of the First Amendment, and which in most instances
preceded either adoption of the original Bill of Rights or ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 120 Often the textual differences not only
reflected independence of the federal charter, but codified the state's
unique commitment to religious pluralism.121 By departing from the
Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith122 to strictly scrutinize denials of
exemption of minority believers from neutral regulations that burden
their faith, state courts were not "legislating" unenumerated rights. At
most, these courts tinkered with the balance to be struck between a
textually protected right of conscience and the governmental interest in
the geographically smaller "laboratory" of the individual state.
Indeed, it is arguable that the state judges were doing even less; by
endorsing strict scrutiny, they simply affirmed the presumption that
state constitutions remained unaffected by the Supreme Court's
retraction of the guarantees of the Free Exercise Clause in Smith. As
Professor Ledewitz has convincingly argued, when the Supreme Court
repeals protection previously afforded by a federal constitutional right,
it is presumed that prior interpretations of state constitutions remain in
full force and effect and should not be interpreted in lockstep with the
winnowing of the federal right. 123 Hence state courts could interpret
their constitutions to demand strict scrutiny of burdens on religion in
the post-Smith era without being accused of engaging in "judicial
legislation."
By contrast, under "traditional" measures of interpretation, it is
more difficult to find same-sex marriage guaranteed by state
constitutions. There is no textually explicit right to same sex marriage
120. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
122. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
123. Bruce Ledewitz, When Federal Law is Also State Law: The Implications for State
Constitutional Law Methodology of Footnote Seven in Commonwealth v. Matos, 72 TEMP. L.
REv. 561 (1999).
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in state constitutions, nor is there a documented tradition of gay
marriage that can be deemed codified by broader constitutional
language. Without benefit of specific history or text, proponents of
same sex marriage have founded their claims in the more general
contours of the equal protection or privacy clauses of the state charters.
As the Supreme Court's forays into substantive due process and the
penumbral right of a woman to choose whether to terminate a
pregnancy have demonstrated, the counter-majoritarian role of courts
is most vulnerable when employed to find unenumerated rights in
constitutions. At least in theory, amendments to state constitutions
banning gay marriage may reflect the desire to hamstring "activist"
judges from authoring new rights that lack either textual or historic
pedigree rather than evidence of animosity towards non-mainstream
sects.
In sum, the spate of state constitutional amendments outlawing
same-sex marriage may either: (1) codify majority religious principles
that do not repudiate specific contrary beliefs founded in smaller
faiths, or (2) reject "activist" judging in favor of the right of the people
to weigh autonomy versus collective security for rights that are not
textually enshrined in state constitutions. Under either explanation,
bans on same-sex marriage are not by-products of an unwillingness to
honor minority religion. Accordingly, worshipers of smaller sects may
remain secure in the warmer embrace provided by the liberty of
conscience clauses of state constitutions after being left out in the cold
by the Supreme Court's diminution of the Free Exercise Clause in
Smith.
B. The "Mistake" Hypothesis
A second hypothesis yields a more pessimistic view of state
constitutional respect for minority faiths. It is true that unlike the
reaction to actual or threatened judicial decisions sanctioning gay
marriage, no state constitutional amendments emerged to preempt or
override post-Smith interpretations of state constitutions adopting the
compelling interest test for laws that happen to burden religion. To the
contrary, by constitutional amendment in Alabama and by legislation
in twelve other states, voters endorsed restoration of strict scrutiny.
While members of minority religions are the leading beneficiaries of
instating strict scrutiny under state constitutions, it is not axiomatic
that guaranteeing non-mainstream liberty is the actual impetus for
majoritarian faiths' acceptance of the increased protection. Under the
[VOL. 6:21
THE SANCTITY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
"mistake" hypothesis, majority religions support the more rigorous
standard of review because of their perception that the Supreme
Court's repudiation of strict scrutiny in Smith was symptomatic of a
larger diminution of the constitutional status of mainstream religion.
As a practical matter, the Smith Court's institutional transfer of
the guarantee of religious liberty from the courts to majoritarian
legislative processes will not jeopardize mainstream Judeo-Christian
congregants. The Court nonetheless relegated aspects of the federal
constitutional right to Free Exercise of Religion to second-class status
behind other "fundamental" rights not subject to invasion absent
compelling justification. Demotion in rank of Free Exercise was a
further symbolic blow to mainstream faiths already disenchanted by
the Court's interpretation of the second religious prong of the First
Amendment-the Establishment Clause-to prevent any preference
for religion over irreligion, l1 4 as well as to limit expression of their
majoritarian beliefs. 12f Viewed in this light, state constitutional
"restoration" of the compelling interest/no less restrictive alternatives
test affirmed the preferred constitutional status of religion, with no
particular solicitude for idiosyncratic faith traditions. 126 While as a
practical matter it may have been a mistake to perceive that Smith
imperiled their liberty, majoritarian faiths nonetheless were motivated
to support construction of state constitutions that preserved religious
freedom eroded by the Supreme Court.
Under the "mistake" hypothesis, there is consonance between
initiation of state constitutional amendments repudiating same sex
marriage and acquiescence to the wave of state constitutional
endorsement of strict scrutiny for burdens on religion. Both enshrine
in state constitutions majoritarian religious values not similarly
captured by the federal constitution. Rather than take solace in state
constitutions as a refuge, members of minority faiths should be
concerned, just as James Madison warned, that dominant religious
124. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
125. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (prayer at high school
football game violates Establishment Clause); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (prayer
by member of clergy at graduation ceremony offends Establishment Clause).
126. RFRA was supported by the Coalition of the Free Exercise of Religion, which
included not only smaller sects but also the American Jewish Committee, the Baptist Joint
Committee, the Christian Legal Society, the General Council on Finance and Administration
of the United Methodist Church, and the National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA.
See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Coalition for Free Exercise of Religion at Appendix A, Cutter
v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (No. 03-9877), available at http://www.becketfund.org/
pdfs/328_28.pdf. Among those testifying in favor of the bill were the Baptist Joint Committee
on Public Affairs and the United States Catholic Conference. S. REP. No. 103-111, at 2
(1993).
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factions may more readily exert power at the state rather than the
national level. The mainstream religions' capturing of state
constitutions may stand as an omnipresent danger to, rather than safe
harbor for, congregants of unpopular sects.
C. The "Utilitarian" Hypothesis
A third hypothesis repudiates the "all or none" vision of the
earlier theses in favor of a "utilitarian" approach to the safety afforded
minority faiths by state constitutions. The "bans on gay marriage have
nothing to do with minority religion" hypothesis rests its optimism
regarding the power of state constitutions to safeguard non-mainstream
faith on: (1) begging the question whether majority faiths would
respect state constitutional interpretations honoring minority religious
beliefs that in turn contradicted mainstream tenets, and (2) adopting a
theoretical explanation for repudiation of same-sex marriage that
ignores evidence that opposition to gay marriage is founded in
religious beliefs. The "mistake" theory presupposes that interests of
minority faiths played no role in impelling acceptance of strict scrutiny
as the state constitutional gauge for burdens on religion. Yet in those
states where the compelling interest test was a product of court
decision rather than constitutional amendment or legislation, litigants
advocating broader liberty generally were followers of minority
religious traditions. 12  The "utilitarian" thesis does not rest on any of
the foregoing presumptions. Rather, it posits that state constitutions
are a more reliable source of protection for non-mainstream faiths, but
only with respect to tenets that do not contradict or impose a cost upon
mainstream religious values.
The state constitutional cases adopting strict scrutiny of neutral
laws whose effect was to impose burdens on religion did not protect
conduct of non-mainstream religions that impugns tenets of Judeo-
Christian faith. By permitting the Native American Longhouse police
officer to wear his hair long as his faith required, the New York
Supreme Court did not ratify actions that majoritarian religions would
127. Rourke v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 603 N.Y.S.2d 647 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993),
affd 615 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (Native American Longhouse religion); In re
Miller, 252 A.D.2d 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (Amish); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d
393 (Minn. 1990) (Amish); State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235 (Amish); Humphrey v. Lane, 728
N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio 2000); (Native American Spirituality); State v. Bontrager, 683 N.E.2d 126
(Ohio App. Ct. 1996) (Amish); Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992) (Native
American Church of the United States).
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deem sinful. 128  While exempting the Amish from displaying an
orange and red slow-moving vehicle triangle on their buggies because
the alternative use of grey reflective tape would satisfy the
government's safety interest without compromising Amish faith, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court did not expose non-Amish motorists to
symbols banished by their own religion.' 9 Endorsement of the
compelling interest test, however, permits sacrificing the outsider's
belief where it contradicts a mainstream religious tenet that found its
expression in state law. From a utilitarian perspective, the compelling
interest test leaves ample room for outlawing actions that contravene
mainstream faith, and at the same time, strict scrutiny tolerates non-
mainstream practices that impose no significant cost to the religion of
the majority.
The success of the state constitutional march to outlaw same
sex marriage fits the utilitarian thesis. Perhaps more than any other
aspect of modem American life, marriage between persons of the same
sex repudiates literal Judeo-Christian interpretations of their religious
texts. Because of the unacceptable cost to majority faiths, state
constitutions not only fail to protect same-sex marriage but-more
overtly than federal constitutional law-ban the practice outright.
Under the "utilitarian" hypothesis, state constitutions have
fulfilled, in part, their institutional mission of serving as successful
"laboratories" for enhanced sanctity of minority religious faith. The
United States Constitution safeguards liberty of conscience only from
state and local laws that purposefully limit religious practices. State
constitutions more generally except worshipers of smaller sects from
laws which, while passed in ignorance of any religious conflicts, in
effect burden their faith. While highly valuable to worshipers of non-
mainstream faiths, state constitutional protection is likely to stop at the
border at which exercise of their religion trammels majoritarian
religious values.
IX. CONCLUSION
Comparing state constitutional treatment of religious
exemption from general laws to the issue of same-sex marriage does
not yield a definitive barometer of the sanctity of minority faiths under
128. Rourke v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 603 N.Y.S.2d 647 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993),
aff'd 615 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
129. State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235 (Wis. 1996).
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state charters. Further evidence of whether followers of non-
mainstream faith may obtain greater latitude under state constitutions
than their federal counterpart may be gleaned in the near future by
state constitutional challenges to tuition vouchers, faith-based
initiatives and other ventures that disproportionately allocate public
funds to coffers of majority faiths. 30 Regardless of which hypothesis
proves valid, in Twenty-First Century America, state constitutions,
rather than the United States Constitution, will define the true liberty
of the increasing numbers of those professing non-mainstream beliefs.
130. Compare Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (tuition voucher program
does not violate Establishment Clause of United States Constitution) with Chittenden Town
Sch. Dist. v. Dept. of Educ., 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999) (tuition reimbursement to sectarian
schools violates the compelled support clause of the Vermont Constitution). See also Locke v.
Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (interpreting State of Washington Constitution to bar allocation of
state scholarship funds for tuition to pursue a pastoral degree does not offend Free Exercise
Clause of United States Constitution).
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